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ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATORY POWERS: THE NATIONAL
MUNITIONS CONTROL BOARD
Probably no industry is as intimately associated with the na-
tional diplomacy as the munitions industry., The industry recog-
nizes no national boundaries- and seldom hesitates to defy na-
tional policy.3 It will sell to anyone who will buy, whether the
purchaser is an ally or a potential enemy of the home govern-
ment.4 The result is that the industry may, and sometimes does,
embarrass or even frustrate the country's neutrality program.,
The international traffic in arms is consequently becoming of
great political significance.6 This traffic has been characterized
by Major General Fuller of the British Army as "* * * all rather
a dirty business and most difficult to get to the bottom of * * ."I
1. 11 Encyc. Soc. Sci., Munitions Industry (1935). Sen. Rep. No. 944,
74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) part 3, pp. 10-12, and part 4.
2. Ibid. The Senate Hearings revealed the existence of close associations
between American, German and British armament firms, the division of
profits, the protection of each other's interests, and concerted action to
offset outside competition. Hearings before the Special Committee Investi-
gating the Munitions Industry, U. S. Senate, 73rd Cong. (1934) part 1,
exhibits 11, Ila, 12, 13, and 804; part 5, exhibits 45, 462, 465, 473, 475,
493, and 512, and part 39. (This series will hereafter be referred to as
Hearings). Sen. Rep. No. 944, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) part 3, pp.
12-13, and part 5.
3. Some of the munitions companies have circumvented the President's
arms embargo applying to Boliva and Paraguay. Hearings, part 3, exhibit
390, part 4, exhibit 364, part 5, exhibit 477, and part 9, pp. 2344-2355.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et al. (1936) 299 U. S. 304,
57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. ed. 255; United State v. Abelow (D. C. N. Y. 1936)
14 F. Supp. 304. See United States v. American Armament Corp. et al.
(1935), United States v. Armatos (1936) and United States v. Pierce
(1936) summarized in H. Doc. No. 10, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., First Annual
Report of the National Munitions Control Board For the Year Ending
Nov. 30, 1936 (1937) 71-2. American firms have armed Germany in viola-
tion of our treaties, Hearings, part 5, exhibits 507, 508, 509, and 512, and
part 6, exhibits 593, and 595. A bibliography on embargoes may be found
in Library of Congress, List of References on Embargoes (compiled under
direction of Herman H. B. Meyer, 1917).
4. 11 Encyc. Soc. Sci., Munitions Industry (1935) 132.
5. Supra, note 3. See Hearings, part 9 (1935) 2273, 2282, 2295, 2317,
2344, and 2355; and part 38 (1937) 12775, 12781, 12793, 12806, 12827, and
12837. Sen. Rep. No. 944, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. part 3 (1936).
6. H. R. Rep. No. 1602, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 3.
7. Hearings, 12440. See Hearings, part 8, exhibits '782 and 795. A state-
ment of the fifty-three points developed by the Hearings may be found in
74 Cong. Rec. 455-456 (1935). Sen. Rep. No. 944, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess.(1936) parts 2, 3, 5, and 6.
Bibliographies on the industry may be found in 11 Encyc. Soc. Sci.,
Munitions Industry (1935) 134; Johnsen, International Traffic in Arms and
Munitions (1934) ; Perris, The War Traders (1914) ; Newbold, How Europe
Armed for War (1916); Engelbrecht and Hanighen, Merchants of Death
(1934).
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The National Munitions Control Board8 was created by the
Neutrality Act as a move toward co-ordinated federal super-
vision of the manufacture and international traffic in arms and
munitions" and the elimination of the secrecy in which the Amer-
ican munitions industry was shrouded.'0 The Board consists of
the Secretary of State, who is the chairman and executive officer
of the Board, and the Secretaries of War, Navy, Treasury, and
Commerce. To this end" every person who engages in the busi-
ness of manufacturing, exporting, or importing any of the arti-
cles declared by the President 2 to be arms, ammunition, or im-
plements of war is required to register'3 with the chairman of
8. The administration of the Act is vested, for the most part, in the
Department of State. H. Doc. No. 10, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) First
Annual Report of the National Munitions Control Board For the Year End-
ing Nov. 30, 1936.
9. Joint Resolution approved by the President on May 1, 1937, amending
the joint resolution of August 31, 1935 (1935) 50 Stat. 126, (1937) 22
U. S. C. A. sec. 245b. This resolution is in essence the same, so far as
the Board is concerned, as the neutrality act of August 31, 1935, which
expired on May 1, 1937. In the new bill the registration fee was reduced
from $500 to $100 for persons whose total sales amount to less than $50,000
a year. For a criticism of the earlier act see Jessup, Toward Further
Neutrality Legislation (1936) 30 Am. J. Int. Law 262; of the present bill,
see Jessup, Neutrality Legislation-1937 (1937) 31 Am. J. Int. Law 306.
10. H. R. Rep. No. 1602, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). Hearings Before
the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 8788, House of Representatives,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 3.
11. H. R. Reps. No. 1602 and 1883, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). 74
Cong. Rec. 13797 (1935). 141 Commer. and Fin. Chr. (1935) 2048.
12. Executive proclamation No. 2236, May 1, 1937 lists those articles
declared by the President to be arms, ammunition, and implements of war.
State Department Publication No. 1023, International Traffic in Ar-ms (4th
ed. 1937) 4. The present list of items declared by the President to be arms,
ammunition, and implements of war includes, with the exceptions of air-
craft and aircraft parts, only actual military instruments.
13. H. Doc. No. 10, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., First Annual Report of the
National Munitions Control Board For the Year Ending Nov. 30, 1936
(1937) 39-49 lists one hundred and forty-nine persons and companies which
have registered with the Board in compliance with the provisions of the
Act. 16 Cong. Digest (1937) 105 lists 120 manufacturers which have regis-
tered. The latter list does not include export or import firms which have
also registered.
The prerequisite of registration is not unusual. See, e. g., Securities Act
of 1933 (1933) 48 Stat. 78, (1936) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 77 f.; Stockyards
and Stockyard Dealers Act (1921) 42 Stat. 163, (1927) 7 U. S. C. A. sec.
203; Industrial Alcohol Act (1919) 41 Stat. 319, (1927) 27 U. S. C. A.
sec. 72; Air Commerce Act of 1926 (1934) 48 Stat. 1115, (1936) 49 U. S.
C. A. sec. 181; Grain Futures Act (1935) 49 Stat. 1495, (1936) 7 U. S.
C. A. sec. 6 f.; and (1936) 49 Stat. 1500, (1936) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 12a;
Miscellaneous Taxes (1890) 26 Stat. 618, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 771;
(1890) 26 Stat. 618, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 711; (1890) 26 Stat. 618,
(1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 751; (1894) 28 Stat. 560, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A.
sec. 931(b) (c); (1912) 37 Stat. 81, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1073(e);
(1878) R. S. sec. 3258, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1162; (1926) 44 Stat. 96,
(1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1384; (1878) R. S. sec. 3233, (1935) 26 U. S.
C. A. sec. 1401.
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the Board his name, or business name, his principal place of
business, and places of business in the United States, and a list
of the arms, ammunition, and implements of war in which he
deals., All persons importing or exporting such articles are
required to obtain in advance a license from the Secretary of
State covering each individual shipment. 5 Registrants are also
required to maintain, subject to the inspection of the duly author-
ized agents of the Board or of any other enforcement agency of
the government of the United States, and distinct from all other
records, such special permanent records of manufacture for ex-
port, importation, and exportation of the aforementioned arti-
cles as the Secretary of State shall prescribe.16
It would seem indispensable to a full realization of the pur-
poses of this Act that complete and accurate information as to
the arms traffic be available. One would therefore expect that
the National Munitions Control Board is possessed of compre-
hensive fact finding powers. But strangely enough, the Board,
-unlike so many other administrative boards,1 7 has been granted
few explicit powers of investigation. It is essential to the effica-
ciousness of this act that these powers at least permit the Board
14. (1935) 50 Stat. 124, (1937) 22 U. S. C. A. sec. 245b(b). Cf. A Con-
vention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammu-
nition and in Implements of War, art. 4, signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925,
79 Cong. Rec. 8783-8796 (1935).
15. (1935) 50 Stat. 124, (1937) 22 U. S. C. A. sec. 245b(f).
16. (1935) 50 Stat. 124, (1937) 22 U. S. C. A. sec. 245b(e). Among the
matters required to be recorded are: the amounts and estimated values of
the arms, ammunition, and implements of war manufactured for export, or
which are exported or imported; the consignors of articles imported and the
port of origin of each shipment; and the consignees and destination of each
shipment.
A list of customers is a trade secret, Hopkins, The Law of Trademarks,
Tradenames and Unfair Competition (4th ed. 1924) see. 109. But it is
extremely doubtful whether the Board could be prevented from publishing
this information, even though it might inure to the benefit of the party's
competitors, for an order which is justified by a lawful purpose is not
rendered illegal by some other motive in the mind of the officer issuing it.
Dakota v. S. D. (1919) 250 U. S. 190, 39 S. Ct. 507, 63 L. ed. 910, 924,
4 A. L. R. 1623, P. U. R. 1919D, 717; Phil. v. Stimpson (1840) 14 Pet.
448, 458, 459, 10 L. ed. 535, 540, 541; United States v. Chemical Founda-
tion (1926) 272 U. S. 1, 14, 15, 47 S. Ct. 1, 71 L. ed. 131, 142, 143. Such
an exercise of power would seem to be within the police power. But com-
pare Rush, Expansion of Federal Supervision of Securities Through the
Inquisitional and Census Powers of Congress-A Suggestion (1938) 36
Mich. L. Rev. 426, fn. 59.
17. Compare the Securities and Exchange Commission (1936) 49 Stat.
1379, (1936) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78u; the Federal Trade Commission (1914)
38 Stat. 721, (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 46; the National Labor Relations
Board (1935) 49 Stat. 455, (1936) 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 161; and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (1922) 42 Stat. 624, (1929) 49 U. S. C. A.
sec. 19a.
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to verify the truth of all information filed with it, and to obtain
all the information necessary to give full publicity to the muni-
tions industry."8 With this essential in mind this note will ex-
amine the sufficiency of the investigatory powers which Congress
has deigned to accord the Board.
No cases have, as yet, interpreted any of the provisions of the
Act. In order that the courts' treatment of the Act might be
prophesied, it is therefore necessary to draw upon the cases inter-
preting other federal statutes conferring similar powers of in-
vestigation upon the administrative bodies and officers.
The primary source of the Board's investigatory powers lies
in the above-mentioned requirement that prescribed permanent
records of manufacture for export, importation and exportation
be maintained by the armament firms subject to inspection by
the Board. 9 Both the state 2 and the federal1 law are replete
18. Blaisdell, Jr., The Federal Trade Commission (1932) 261.
19. Supra, note 16.
20. Karr v. Baldwin (D. C. N. D. Tex. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 252 (employ-
ment agencies); State v. Legora (1931) 162 Tenn. 122, 34 S. W. (2d) 1056
(junk dealers; see also 30 A. L. R. 973 and 88 A. L. R. 973 for annotations
on junk dealers) ; State v. Knight (1929) 34 N. M. 217, 279 Pac. 947 (cat-
tle hides to be preserved) ; People v. Zimmerman (1925) 213 App. Div. 414,
210 N. Y. S. 269, aff'd (1926) 241 N. Y. 405, 150 N. E. 497 (secret socie-
ties of twenty or more persons) ; Reaves Warehouse Corp. v. Commonwealth
(1925) 141 Va. 194, 126 S. E. 87 (sales of leaf tobacco) ; City of St. Louis
v. Baskowitz (1918) 273 Mo. 543, 201 S. W. 870 (junk dealers); State v.
Sterrin (1916) 78 N. H. 220, 98 Atl. 482 (motorists causing injuries);
Ex parte Kneedler (1912) 243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983 (motorists must leave
name, residence, and operator's license upon knowingly injuring persons
or property); Hughes v. State (1912) 67 Tex. Crim. Rep. 333, 149 S. W.
173 (express companies); St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Hixon (Tex. Civ. App.
1910) 126 S. W. 338 (employers required to give employees written state-
ments of the cause of their discharge); State v. Davis (1910) 68 W. Va.
142, 69 S. E. 639 (druggists' liquor sales); Sanning v. City of Cincinnati
(1909) 81 Ohio St. 142, 90 N. E. 125 (salary loan brokers and chattel
mortgage brokers); State v. Pence (1909) 173 Ind. 99, 89 N. E. 488 (drug-
gists' liquor sales) ; Parks v. Laurens Cotton Mills (1907) 75 S. C. 560, 56
S. E. 234 (cotton buyers) ; People v. Schneider (1905) 139 Mich. 673, 103
N. W. 172, 69 L. R. A. 345, 5 Ann. Cas. 790 (automobiles required to
possess licenses); State v. Donovan (1901) 10 N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709
(druggists' liquor sales); Commonwealth v. Intoxicating Liquors (1899)
172 Mass. 311, 52 N. E. 389 (liquors transported); City of St. Joseph v.
Levin (1895) 128 Mo. 588, 31 S. W. 101, 49 Am. St. Rep. 577 (pawn-
brokers) ; State v. Davis (1891) 108 Mo. 666, 18 S. W. 894 (druggists'
liquor sales); Shuman v. City of Ft. Wayne (1891) 127 Ind. 91, 26 N. E.
560 (pawnbrokers) ; Launder v. City of Chicago (1884) 111 Ill. 291 (pawn-
brokers). Also see Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the
Federal Trade Commission (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 906-9.
21. See, e. g., Instructions of the Comptroller of the Currency Relative
to the Organization and Powers of National Banks (1923) ch. 5, sec. 75;
Fed. Reserve Board Regulation F, Series of 1928, superseding Regulation
F of 1924 of the Fed. Reserve Board relating to member banks, sec. 40;
Grain Futures Act (1922) 49 Stat. 1497, (1936) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 7a(3);
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with similar requirements, which are almost always declared con-
stitutional2 2 on the ground that they are necessary and reason-
able police measures.2 3 The constitutional protection against self-
incrimination does not invalidate such provisions, 4 for an ex-
ception is made in the case of information divulged by books
required to be kept. This exception is based on the theory that
it is a condition precedent to the exercise of a privilege25 that
consent be given to keep records subject to inspection, 2 or on
Warehouses Act (1916) 39 Stat. 490, (1927) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 264; (1919)
41 Stat. 267, (1927) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 420; Water Power Act (1921) 41
Stat. 1353, (1927) 16 U. S. C. A. 797; Wire or Radio Communication Act(1936) 49 Stat. 1098), 47 U. S. C. A. sec. 154; Perishable Agricultural Com-
modities Act (1930) 46 Stat. 535, (1935) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 4992; Air Mail
Act (1935) 49 Stat. 618, (1936) 39 U. S. C. A. sec. 469h; (1913) 38 Stat.
271, (1936) 12 U. S. C. A. see. 481. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
has extensive powers to require records, e. g. (1912) 37 Stat. 81, (1935)
26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1073 (b).
In England accounts are often required in great detail, e. g., Ry. Corns.
(Accounts & Returns) Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, ch. 34; Assurance Com-
panies Act (1909) 9 Edw. VII, ch. 49; Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908,
8 Edw. VII, ch. 69; British Sugar (Subsidy) Act, 1925, 15 Geo. V, ch. 12;
Companies Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, ch. 50; National Health Ins. Act, 1924,
14 & 15 Gee. V, ch. 38; Industrial Assurance Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. V,
ch. 8; Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Gee. V, ch. 23.
22. But see People ex rel. Ferguson v. Reardon (1910) 197 N. Y. 236,
90 N. E. 829; cf. City of Clinton v. Phillips (1871) 58 Ill. 102 where the
city did not have the power to create the ordinance in question.
23. State v. Legora (1931) 162 Tenn. 122, 34 S. W. (2d) 1056; United
States v. Clyde Steamship Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1929) 36 F. (2d) 691, cert.
denied (1930) 281 U. S. 744; People v. Harley (1925) 230 Mich. 676, 203
N. W. 531; People v. Zimmerman (1925) 213 App. Div. 414, 210 N. Y.
S. 269, aff'd (1926) 241 N. Y. 405, 150 N. E. 497; Reaves Warehouse
Corp. v. Commonwealth (1925) 141 Va. 194, 126 S. E. 87; Ex parte
Kneedler (1922) 243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983; City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz
(1918) 273 Mo. 543, 201 S. W. 870; I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co. (1912)
224 U. S. 194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. ed. 729, rev. (Con. Ct. 1911) 190 Fed.
943; Hughes v. State (1912) 67 Tex. Crim. Rep. 333, 149 S. W. 173; St.
Louis S. W. Ry. v. Hixon (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) 126 S. W. 338; State v.
Pence (1909) 173 Ind. 99, 89 N. W. 488; Sanning v. Cincinnati (1909) 81
Ohio St. 142, 90 N. E. 125; People v. Schneider (1905) 139 Mich. 673, 103
N. W. 172, 69 L. R. A. 345, 5 Ann. Cas. 790; Commonwealth v. Intoxicating
Liquors (1899) 172 Mass. 311, 52 N. E. 389; City of St. Joseph v. Levin(1895) 128 Mo. 588, 31 S. IV. 101; Shuman v. City of Fort Wayne (1891)
127 Ind. 91, 26 N. E. 560; Launder v. City of Chicago (1884) 111 Ill. 291.
24. Ordinarily the Fourth Amendment applies to administrative officers,
viz. Int. Rev. Agent v. Sullivan (1923) 287 Fed. 138; I. C. C. v. Brimson
(1894) 154 U. S. 447, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 38 L. ed. 1047.
25. It is not necessary that a business be charged with a public interest
in order that it may be required to keep records subject to inspection by
an administrative body or its agents, as witness the taxing power where
such requirements are frequent. Supra, note 21. Bartlett Frazier Co. v.
Hyde (C. C. A. 7, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 350, 352.
26. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. Ashland (1930) 235 Ky. 265, 30 S. W.(2d) 968; State v. W. 0. Bennett (1926) 315 Mo. 1267, 288 S. W. 50;
United States v. Mulligan (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1920) 268 Fed. 893; State
v. Sterrin (1916) 78 N. H. 220, 98 Atl. 482; Shuman v. City of Fort Wayne
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the theory that the books are quasi-public records. 27 Another
rationale is that the government announced its requirement that
the books be kept before any crime existed28 and, as a conse-
quence, the duty to produce books "existed generically, and prior
to the specific act; hence the compulsion is not directed to the
criminal act, but is independent of it, and cannot be attributed
to it.''=9
In like manner the constitutional protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures has been held not to forbid require-
ments that books be kept subject to inspection.30 The courts have
held that the acceptance of a license to engage in a business
regulated by law is a necessary acceptance of the statutory con-
ditions and to that extent an implied waiver of the constitutional
immunity.31 A party who keeps records in accordance with the
(1891) 127 Ind. 91, 26 N. E. 560 which also emphasized fact that this was
a reasonable police regulation; State v. Davis (1891) 108 Mo. 666, 18 S. W.
894. See Karr v. Baldwin (D. C. N. D. Tex. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 252, where
such a regulation was upheld because such businesses have long been sub-
ject to just that sort of scrutiny.
27. State v. Knight (1929) 34 N. M. 217, 279 Pac. 947; Marron et al.
v. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 251; United States v.
Mulligan (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1920) 268 Fed. 893; Paladini v. Superior
Court (1918) 178 Cal. 369, 173 Pac. 588; State v. Donovan (1909) 10
N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709; State v. Davis (1891) 108 Mo. 666, 18 S. W.
894, 32 Am. St. Rep. 640; United States v. Distillery at Petersburg (C. C.,
E. D. Va. 1876) 1 Hughes 533, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,961.
28. N. Y. v. Rosenheimer (1913) 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530, 46 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 977, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 161. See Parks v. Laurens Cotton
Mills (1907) 75 S. C. 560, 56 S. E. 234, where the court said that as the
proceeding was not of a criminal nature, nor an action to declare a for-
feiture the statute did not come within the protection against self-in-
crimination.
29. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2259c; Sullivan v. United
States (1927) 274 U. S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. ed. 1037; State v. Donovan
(1901) 10 N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709; People v. Henwood (1900) 123 Mich.
317, 82 N. W. 70; St. Joseph v. Levin (1894) 128 Mo. 588, 31 S. W. 101;
State v. Smith (1888) 74 Iowa 580, 584, 38 N. W. 492; contra People ex
rel. v. Reardon (1910) 197 N. Y. 236, 90 N. E. 829; cf. State v. Pence
(1909) 173 Ind. 99, 89 N. E. 488.
30. Hodges et al. v. United States (C. C. A. 10, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 593,
596; Schutte v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 830; Gatter-
dam et al. v. United States, Gatterdam v. Same (C. C. A. 6, 1925) 5 F.
(2d) 673; see Kovach v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1931) 53 F. (2d) 639.
In United States Distillery at Petersburg (C. C., E. D. Va. 1876) 1
Hughes 533, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14961 and in State ex rel. City of Minn. v.
Minn. St. Ry. Co. et al. (1923) 154 Minn. 401, 191 N. W. 1004, 1008 the
courts said that the books required to be kept were quasi-public records
and were intended for use as much by the government as the party keep-
ing them and therefore the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures was not applicable.
31. United States v. Vlahos (D. C. D. Ore. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 166;
Marron v. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 251; Wibmer v.
State (1923) 182 Wis. 303, 195 N. W. 936.
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provisions of the Neutrality Act cannot, therefore, complain that
the Board has inspected the required records without recourse to
a search warrant 2 or to hearings upon complaints of violations
of the statute.3 3 But this right to inspect the books does not, of
itself, give the right to make a forcible entry to make such in-
spection.34 In those instances in which a party becomes con-
tumacious3 5 and refuses to admit the agents of the Board in order
that they might inspect the required permanent records, the
agents must resort to the aid of a search warrant36 and are not
able to break into the premises, because the implied consent does
not include the privilege to force oneself into the premises or to
destroy property upon them.3T On like principles, the right to
inspect the books would not include the right to seize them.38
Although the constitutionality of the provision that books be
maintained subject to inspection by the Bord is clear, real prob-
lems in regard to these prescribed records would arise should
an attempt be made to verify statements in them or to deter-
mine whether material matter was omitted. The act obviously
seeks correct statements by registrants. 9 It would, accordingly,
be a violation of the Act to give the Board untrue or incomplete
statements.40 But it should be remembered that the records are
32. Marron v. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 251.
33. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States (N. Y. 1937) 14 F. Supp.
407, aff'd (1936) 300 U. S. 139, 57 S. Ct. 407, 81 L. ed. 562. A distinction
must be drawn between the situations where prescribed books may be re-
quired and where the administrative body may only search through records
mot required to be kept. Thus the Federal Trade Commission and the
National Labor Relations Board, both of which are of the latter type, may
only make such searches upon complaints. Note (1936) 22 WASHINGTON
UNIvERsiTY LAW QUARTERLY 81, 93, fn. 50a.
34. United States v. Kraus (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1921) 270 Fed. 578.
35. The extent to which companies may be contumacious in regard to
submitting their books is shown in In re Financial Transactions of the
N. Y., N. Haven & Hartford R. Co. (1914) 31 I. C. C. 32. The great majority
of business men, however, are not contumacious. Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr.,
The Federal Trade Commission (1932) 262.
36. Books required to be kept are "property used as means to commit a
felony," (1917) 40 Stat. 228, (1927) 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 612. They are
therefore subject to search warrant under the statute. In re Rosenwasser
Bros. (D. C. N. Y. 1918) 254 Fed. 171; United States v. Kirschenblatt
(C. C. A. N. Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 202.
37. United States v. Kraus (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1921) 270 Fed. 578.
38. Ibid.
39. Cf. Note (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 822.
40. (1937) 50 Stat. 128, 22 U. S. C. A. see. 245g provides penal sanctions.
Penal actions are often included in statutes conferring administrative
powers, e. g. I. C. C. (1893) 27 Stat. 443, (1934) 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 46;
F. T. C. (1914) 38 Stat. 723, (1934) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 50; S. E. C. (1934)
48 Stat. 900, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78u(c); F. C. C. (1934) 48 Stat. 1097,
47 U. S. C. A. sec. 409(j) ; Federal Power Commission (1935) 49 Stat. 857,
(1936) 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 825f; National Labor Relation Board (1935)
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self-serving accounts, and the penalties for perjury4' can hardly
be viewed as an adequate deterrent to a group of men who in-
tend to evade the Neutrality Act.42 The perjury, furthermore,
must be discovered before it can be punished. But in this in-
stance discovery is the very power sought.
The dearth of powers granted the Board would seem to neces-
sitate the Board's resort to criminal proceedings in order to
verify records. 43 Where there is "probable cause" to believe that
the records contained false statements a search warrant could
be issued for those documents or articles which are used to avoid
keeping accurate records, which is the crime itself."4 But in most
instances the Board would not be able to establish the necessary
prerequisite to obtaining a search warrant, namely, "probable
cause ;''4. for a survey of the records would usually not reveal
sufficient information to give the Board good reason to suspect
that some of the information rendered was false. As most big
armament-producing companies are not exclusively arms firms,4 6
it would not be too difficult to cover up discrepancies that might
appear in the records by charging them off to the remainder of
49 Stat. 455, (1936) 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 161; The Tariff Act of 1930 (1930)
46 Stat. 707, (1937) 19 U. S. C. A. sec. 1341(b). Board of Trade v. Olsen(1923) 262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L. ed. 839 held the penal provision
in the Grain Futures Act (1922) 42 Stat. 998, 1003, (1934) 7 U. S. C. A.
secs. 6, 13, which required that persons keep written records of certain
prescribed contracts to be constitutional. In regard to this problem see
Note (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 312, 316.
41. Ibid. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in the
United States (1927) 333 in which the author discusses the report to the
insurance commissioner as self-serving.
42. The extent to which a corporation will go to falsify records and
accounts may be seen in St. Paul & Puget Sound Accounts (1914) 29 I.
C. C. 508.
The extent to which the English munitions license provisions have been
circumvented is shown in Hearings, part 3, exhibit 260.
43. The Neutrality Act provides for a penalty of imprisonment exceed-
ing one year and consequently the offense of violating the Act is deemed
a felony (1909) 35 Stat. 1152, (1927) 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 541. Where a
statute provides punishment which amounts to a felony, it need not ex-
pressly provide that it is a felony for the Code of Criminal Procedure
supplies the omission (1909) 35 Stat. 1152, (1927) 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 541.
Tyomies Pub. Co. et al. v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1914) 211 Fed. 385,
28 C. C. A. 47; cf. United States v. Chapman (D. C., S. D. Ala., S. D.
1931) 3 F. Supp. 900.
44. United States v. Kraus (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1921) 270 Fed. 578.
45. Cornelius, The Law of Search and Seizure (1926) sec. 82.
46. One of the most important features of munitions firms is their com-
posite character. They produce goods used primarily in peace, as well as
arms. The industry is intimately bound up with the general manufacturing
industry. Ralph H. Stimson, The Private Manufacture of Arms (Ja. 1935)
16 Acad. Pol. Sci. Proc. 1; I. C. I. Before the Arms Commission (Feb. 8,
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the company's business, thereby preventing the records from
speaking for themselves in regard to the existence of any "prob-
able cause." If "probable cause" could be established, it would
still be necessary to describe the property sought by the warrant
with particularity, 47 because fishing expeditions for evidence are
forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.4 8 Thus the Board might
often be in the predicament of not knowing just what articles
would establish the violation of the Act, and consequently would
be unable to verify the statements made in the records.
Where, on the othe hand, the records did not contain full
information, the problem for the Board would be even more
difficult than where the records were incorrect. Many of the
arms works are merely small departments of giant steel and
chemical companies. 9 If arms were being manufactured in one
of many plants, or were being shipped in secret from one of
them, it would be virtually impossible to discover the crime, as
the records might not reveal these secret actions. Because of the
Gargantuan size of such companies it would be relatively simple
to conceal guilty operations. As the Board is not allowed to rove
at will through a firm's properties or otherwise fish for evidence
of infringements of the Act,50 the Board is virtually helpless to
prevent violations.
Still another power which, upon analysis, is found to be inade-
quate to close the aforementioned loop-holes in the Act is the
authority of the Secretary of State to promulgate such rules and
regulations with regard to its enforcement as he may deem neces-
sary to carry out its provisions.51 In order to determine the ac-
curacy and completeness of the records it is probable that the
Board would require, at the very least, the power to subpoena
witnesses; to compel the production of books, papers, correspon-
dence, memoranda, and other records relevant to the inquiry;
and to inspect the properties of the registrant"5 2 * * * in order
47. Cornelius, op. cit., sec. 122.
48. F. T. C. v. P. Lorillard Co. (D. C. N. Y. 1922) 283 Fed. 999, aff'd in
F. T. C. v. American Tobacco Co. (1924) 264 U. S. 298, 44 S. Ct. 336, 68
L. ed. 696, 32 A. L. R. 786.
49. Supra, note 46.
50. United States v. Kraus (D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1921) 270 Fed. 578.
Supra, note 48.
51. (1935) 50 Stat. 124, (1937) 22 U. S. C. A. see. 245b.
52. Under the N. I. R. A. the inspection of properties was not expressly
authorized. The Petroleum Code nevertheless authorized the inspection of
properties, tanks, and pipe lines. Amazon Pet. Corp. v. R. R. Com. (D. C.,
E. D. Tex. 1934) 5 F. Supp. 639 refused to permit such power to be exer-
cised in the absence of express powers. It was overruled by Ryan et al. v.
Amazon Petroleum Corp. (C. C. A. 5, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 1, 8 in which the
decision was seemingly based on the fact that the Foprth Amendment to
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to subject one to inquisitions, visitations, and interrogations by
extrajudicial bodies for the purpose of obtaining information
against them, statutory authority for such claim of right must
the Constitution did not apply because the properties were open to free
entry. The court cited Hester v. United States (1924) 265 U. S. 57, 44
S. Ct. 445, 68 L. ed. 898, which holds that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to open fields, and United States v. Western & Atl. R. (D. C. N. D.
Ga. 1924) in which it was held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to inspection of railroad cars as the Amendment only applies to houses,
papers and effects. Cars on an open track were held not to be private in
that sense.
Almost all codes under the N. 1 R. A. provided for the requiring of
reports and statistics by the members of the code, Prentice Hall, 4 Fed.
Trade & Industry Service, par. 4861, and Lewis Mayers, A Handbook of
NRA (2nd ed. 1934) 35. The N. I. R. A. did not expressly authorize the
inspection of books and papers to determine the accuracy of the reports,
yet a large number of the codes provided for verification of these reports
if doubt as to their accuracy was entertained: Alcoholic Beverage Whole-
sale Code, Art X, see. 2; Asphalt Shingle & Roofing Code, Art. VI, see.
2(d); Anti-Hog Cholera Serum Code, Art. V, sec. 2; Asbestos Code, Art.
VI, sec. 2(c); Asphalt and Mastic Tile Code, Art. VI, sec 2(c); Automo-
tive Parts & Equipment Code, Art. VI-A(3); Brewing Code, Art. VII, see.
2; Amend. no. 2 (approved Sept. 21, 1934, effective Oct. 1, 1934) to Busi-
ness Furniture, Storage Equipment & Filing Supply Industry Code; Cast
Iron Pressure Pipe Code, Art. VI, sec. 6 (b) ; Coat & Suit Code, Art. VI, sec.
2D; Copper Code, Art. VI, sec. 5 (i) ; Distilled Spirits Code, Art. IX, sec. 2;
Distilled Spirits Rectifying Code, Art. X, see. 2; Fabricated Metal Code,
Art. IV, sec. 6; Fibre Can & Tube Code, Art. VII, sec. 7; Fire Extinguish-
ing Appliance Code, Art. VI, see. 2(g); Fishery Code, Art. VII, sec. 2,
Imported Date Packing Code, Art. VI-B, see. 1(d); Investment Bankers
Code, Art. X, see. 7; Iron & Steel Code, Art. IX, sec. 2; Malleable Iron
Code, Art. VII, see. 2; Mayonnaise Code, Art. VI, sec. 1(e); Men's Cloth-
ing Code, Art. XIII; Metal Etching Code, Art. V, sec. 9; Motion Picture
Laboratory Code, Art. III, sec. 5; Motor Fire Apparatus Code, Art. VI, sec.
2; Motor Vehicle Storage & Parking Code, Art. V, Div. B, see. 3; Petroleum
Code in Puerto Rico, Art. III, rule 23; Raw Peanut Milling Code, Art. VII,
sec. 2; Rayon & Silk Dyeing Code, Art. IX; Reinforcing Materials Code,
Art. IX, see. 2; Rubber Mfg. Code, Art. II-A, sec. 4(e); Rubber Tire Code,
Art. II-A, sec. 4(d); Set Up Paper Box Code, Art. VII, see. 1; Southern
Rice Milling Code, Art. VII, sec. 2; Steel Casting Code, Art. V, sec. 5;
Trucking Code, Art. X, sec. 3; Underwear Code, "Reports to Industry
Ctte." sec. 5; Watch Case Mfg. Code, Art. VI, sec. 3; Waxed Paper Code,
Art. VII, sec. 1; Wholesale Automotive Code, Art. VIII-D; Wholesale Con-
fectioners' Industry Code, Art. VI, sec. 14(c); and Wine Code, Art. VIII,
sec. 2. The code for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan Area
in and about the City of New York (approved Apr. 13, 1934, effective April
23, 1934, with amendments approved and effective Sept. 25, 1934) Prentice-
Hall, 2 Federal Trade & Industry Service, par. 11,297, provided for the
giving of reports, but not for their verification. The Schecter case, which
dealt with that code, consequently did not have to take up the issue as to
the authority for such provisions for verification of the reports. That issue
was, therefore, never decided by the courts.
It is interesting to note that the Small Arms & Ammunitions Mfg. In-
dustry Code of Fair Competition, Art. VII, sec. 1, Art. IX, sec. 1, provided
for verification of the reports.
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be shown to plainly and definitely confer upon such bodies such
authority.'. 3 If the Secretary of State undertook, by virtue of
this power, to supply omissions in the law he would, accordingly,
be violating the principle of separation of powers and hence
would be acting illegally.54 The maximum power the courts seem
to have permitted administrative agencies under similar broad
powers to make necessary rules and regulations is the authority
to make minor and routine regulations and to define the termi-
nology used in the statute under which the agency was created."
Although the Board is incapable, as a practical matter, of
discovering false statements or omissions in the required records
by resorting to its own powers, it would seem that cooperation
with the Board by other bodies of the national government might
give the Board some of the information which it desired. Such
cooperation is not unknown in the national government for the
Army and Navy have long cooperated on varied matters. It is
possible, for example, that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
who has broad and extensive investigatory powers"' might ob-
tain information of value to the Board-information which the
Board would be unable to obtain for itself. There is no express
provision in this Act providing for such cooperation, 7 but no
53. Amazon Pet. Corp. v. R. R. Com. (C. C., E. D. Tex. 1934) 5 F. Supp.
639, reversed by Ryan et al. v. Amazon Pet. Corp. (C. C. A. 5, 1934) 71
F. (2d) 1. Accord, Harriman v. I. C. C. (1908) 311 U. S. 408, 29 S. Ct.
115, 53 L. ed. 253; and Overton Refining Co. v. Terrell et al. (1933) 4 F.
Supp. 443.
54. Ardsley Club v. Durey (D. C. N. Y. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 293. Regula-
tions have no binding effect if they alter, amend, or extend the statute,
Greenport Basin & Construction Co. v. United States, Young v. United
States (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1920) 269 Fed. 58, aff'd (1923) 260 U. S. 512,
43 S. Ct. 183, 67 L. ed. 370; 6 B. T. A. 265; and 9 B. T. A. 246. A regula-
tion made under a statute must have a definite relation to the statute's
purpose, United States v. Bohl (D. C. Conn. 1903) 125 Fed. 625.
55. Hurwitz v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1922) 280 Fed. 109; Tucker
v. Williamson (D. C. S. D. Ohio, E. D. 1915) 229 Fed. 201; Coopersmiller
v. Lemon (C. C. A. 6, 1908) 163 Fed. 145, 89 C. C. A. 595; Avery v. Comsr.
(1934) 292 U. S. 210, 54 S. Ct. 674, 78 L. ed. 1216; Magnano Co. v. Hamil-
ton (1934) 292 U. S. 40, 46, 54 S. Ct. 599, 602, 78 L. ed. 1109; Old Colony
R. Co. v. Comsr. (1932) 284 U. S. 552, 560, 52 S. Ct. 211, 213, 76 L. ed.
484; Intercoast Trading Co. v. McLaughlin (D. C. N. D. Calif., S. D. 1936)
18 F. Supp. 149. Comer, Legislative Functions of National Administrative
Authorities (1927) 138. Presumably the power to control their internal
operation and to furnish a procedure for third parties to deal with them
would be accorded these bodies if such powers were contested as it would
seem that these powers were those primarily intended to be embraced by
this type of statute.
56. United States v. Vlahos (D. C. C. Ore. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 166.
57. The Foreign Trade Zone Board (1934) 48 Stat. 1001, (1937) 19 U. S.
C. A. sec. 81j, the Federal Power Commission (1921) 41 Stat. 1353, (1927)
16 U. S. C. A. sec. 797(b), and the Federal Trade Commission (1914) 38
Stat. 722, (1927) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 48, are to receive the cooperation of
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private individual could prevent the President from ordering
such cooperation or prevent voluntary cooperation by any ad-
ministrative body in the national government. Cooperation be-
tween the Board and other government agencies, for the enforce-
ment of the Board's duties, seems highly probable in view of the
fact that the Board is composed of five important cabinet officers,
including the Secretary of the Treasury under whom the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue serves.
Inasmuch as there is no adequate way in which to determine
the accuracy and completeness of the information which the
munitions firms have given, except insofar as other governmental
bodies consent to cooperate with the Board, the Board is reduced
to the necessity of relying, in a large measure, upon the courtesy
and the candor of the registrants. Under that situation it is
absurd to look for a satisfactory illumination of "'this most
dangerous of the socially dangerous trades.'"
The inquisitorial powers conceded to the Board seem to be
wholly inadequate. The Board lacks such elementary means of
investigation as the powers to get a mandamus to force a party
to keep the required books,5 8 administer oaths and affirmations,
take depositions, take evidence material to the inquiry, require
reports, and subpoena witnesses. Unlike many other adminis-
trative agencies, the Board is entirely dependent upon the Attor-
ney General's office for the enforcement of those powers which
it does possess.5 9 No provision in the Act permits the Board to
apply directly to the federal courts to secure compliance with its
orders. Nor has the Board adequate powers to discover, of its
own initiative, whether any person is violating or is about to
violate the Act. The Board, furthermore, has no power to make
investigations to accumulate information upon the basis of which
the executive departments and other agencies of the national government
in regard to information which may be requested by the respective com-
missions. The Foreign Trade Zone Board (1934) 48 Stat. 1001, (1937) 19
U. S. C. A. sec. 81i, is directed to cooperate with other state and national
agencies.
58. Supra, note 17. Also compare the Tariff Commission, John Larkin
Day, The President's Control of the Tariff (1936) 16. No federal court
may deal with any controversy over which it has not been given authority
by some constitutional or statutory grant, Mansfield v. Swan (1884) 111
U. S. 379, 382, 28 L. ed. 462, 4 S. Ct. 510; Hanford v. Davies (1896) 163
U. S. 273, 279, 16 S. Ct. 1051, 41 L. ed. 157; Barnette v. Wells Fargo (1925)
270 U. S. 438, 46 S. Ct. 326, 329, 70 L. ed. 781; Gainsville v. Brown-Crum-
mer (1928) 277 U. S. 54, 48 S. Ct. 454, 72 L. ed. 781. The jurisdiction of
federal courts to entertain original actions for mandamus, consequently,
may be conferred only by statute, Cudahy Packing Co. v. United States(C. C. A. 7, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 133.
59. Supra, note 17.
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administrative rules might be promulgated or further Congres-
sional legislation enacted. The Board's inability to subpoena the
books and records of third persons who are not required to be
registered under the Act will be another hindrance to enforce-
ment.59a The meagerness of the investigatory powers conceded
to the Board forms a striking contrast to the broad powers af-
forded to other administrative officers such as the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue.60
Although it would seem essential to adequate control of the
arms industry that Congress know the identity of the persons
chiefly interested in the various munitions firms, the Neutrality
Act makes no provision for such information. To be effective
in that respect the Act should at least require that all shares in
corporations devoted to any considerable degree to the manufac-
ture ofmunitions be registered and that the registration books
of such corporations be open to inspection by the Board.01
In view of the aforementioned deficiencies it seems that those
powers which the Board has are innocuous and, therefore, not
to be taken too seriously for it takes more than a wish, a hope,




60. Compare the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1919)
45 Stat. 1142, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1514. Brownson v. United States
(C. C. A. Mo. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 844; Miles v. United Founders (D. C.
N. J. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 413; United States v. Mobile First Nat. Bk. (D. C.
Ala. 1924) 295 Fed. 142, aff'd 267 U. S. 576, 45 S. Ct. 231, 69 L. ed. 796;
Cooley v. Bergin (D. C. Mass. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 930.
61. The 1921 Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission of the League
of Nations found in Stimson, The Private Manufacture of Arms (1935)
16 Acad. Pol. Sci. Proc. 34 adopted this recommendation.
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